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Multi-directional efficiency analysis (MEA) is an alternative methodology to data envelopment analysis (DEA) that investigates the improvement potentials in each input and output dimension and identifies a benchmark proportional to these potential improvements. This results in a more nuanced picture of the sources of the inefficiency providing opportunities for additional conclusions about which variables the inefficiency is mainly located on. MEA provides insights into not only the level of the inefficiency but also the patterns within the inefficiency, i.e. its sources and location. This paper applies this methodology to Bangladeshi banks to understand the differences in the inefficiency patterns between different subgroups.

This paper analyses the difference in the pattern of inefficiency between the older family-dominated banks and the newer non-family-owned banks in Bangladesh using the recently developed MEAs technology, which enables analysis of patterns within inefficiencies rather than only levels of (in)efficiency. The empirical results show that whilst there are few significant differences in the levels of variable-specific efficiency scores between the two subgroups, there are clearer differences on the inefficiency contributions from particular outputs in most of the study period and also on most variables in the time window of 2007–2009. This finding provides clues to differences in business models and management practice between the two types of banks in Bangladesh.

The empirical results show that whilst there are few significant differences in the levels of variable-specific efficiency scores between the two subgroups (older family-dominated banks and the newer non-family-owned banks), there are clearer differences on the inefficiency contributions from particular outputs in most of the study period and also on most variables in the time window of 2007–2009, during the Global Financial Crisis (GFCs). This finding provides clues to differences in business models and management practice between the two types of banks in Bangladesh.

DEA is a conventional tool for benchmarking in management science. However, conventional benchmarking exercises based on DEA do not reveal significant differences in the sources of inefficiency that show differences in business models. While DEA remains the most utilized technique in the efficiency literature, we think that a more flexible and deeper analysis requires something like MEA.

The contribution is twofold. First, examination of performances of family-owned firms is a well-established but analysis of performances of family-dominated banks is relative scarce. Secondly, isolating the sources of inefficiency which differs between types of banks even if there is no difference in inefficiency levels is absolutely new for a complete data set of conventional banks in Bangladesh. It turns out that there are few (significant) differences between the groups in terms of the inefficiency levels, whereas clear patterns emerge in terms of differences in inefficiency contributions between family-dominated and non-family-owned banks, during the Global Financial Crisis

Using data from the 2013 European Company Survey, this chapter operationalizes the representation gap as the desire for greater employee involvement in decision-making expressed by the representative of the leading employee representative body at the workplace. According to this measure, there is evidence of a substantial shortfall in employee involvement in the European Union, not dissimilar to that reported for the United States. The chapter proceeds to investigate how the size of this representation gap varies by type of representative structure, information provided by management, the resource base available to the representatives, and the status of trust between the parties. Perceived deficits are found to be smaller where workplace representation is via works councils rather than union bodies. Furthermore, the desire for greater involvement is reduced where information provided the employee representative on a range of establishment issues is judged satisfactory. A higher frequency of meetings with management also appears to mitigate the expressed desire for greater involvement. Each of these results is robust to estimation over different country clusters. However, unlike the other arguments, the conclusion that shortfalls in employee involvement representation are smaller under works councils than union bodies is nullified where trust in management is lacking.